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NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent seeks to have the judgment 
sustained on appeal. 
ISSUES STATED BY APPELLANT 
The first three issues as set forth in Appellant's 
brief at pages 1 and 2 are argumentative and set out 
incorrect factual assumptions. 
The initial statement of each issue is generally 
correct. Unfortunately, the statement of the issue is then 
generally followed by an argumentative, misplaced assertion 
of fact or facts in which the asserted facts are generally 
incorrect. 
With respect to the first issue, there is no basis 
whatsoever for the assertion that the terms of the 
handwritten agreement and the typewritten agreement were 
materially different. Further, there is no justification at 
all for the statement that there were undisputed evidence 
and stipulations prior to and during trial that both parties 
intended commissions to be paid according to the rate 
structure alleged by the Plaintiff. The trial court in fact 
found no such undisputed evidence or stipulations. With 
respect to the second issue, Defendant never admitted in its 
Answer, or in its Response to Plaintiff's Motion For Partial 
Summary Judgment, or at the hearing on the Motion For 
Partial Summary Judgment and pre-trial conference, or at the 
first day of trial that there was no dispute concerning the 
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rate structure as alleged by Plaintiff. The Defendant 
contended and the trial court in fact found that the rate 
structure was that which was set forth in the typewritten 
integrated agreement. Further, Plaintiff's statement 
concerning what the trial court ordered at the pre-trial 
settlement conference is incorrect. The trial court did not 
order that the amounts prayed for by Plaintiff would be 
deemed accurate unless Defendant advised Plaintiff prior to 
trial with respect to any offsets or adjustments to which 
Defendant claimed it was entitled. What was stated in an 
order, which was never signed by the trial court, was that 
the amounts prayed for by Plaintiff "shall be deemed 
accurate unless Defendant advises Plaintiff prior to trial 
hereof of any facts, documents or information upon which 
Defendant intends to rely with respect to afty offsets or 
adjustments in said amount to which Defendant claims it is 
entitled" (R. 174) Defendant fully complied with the 
unsigned order. Plaintiff was always advised that the 
typewritten agreement was to be relied upon, and the 
typewritten agreement states explicitly the applicable rate 
structure and conclusively disproves the amounts for which 
Plaintiff had prayed. 
With respect to the third issue, Plaintiff states that 
the Defendant had previously admitted that the rate 
structure alleged by Plaintiff was accurate and that there 
was no real dispute as to the amount of the debt. This is 
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simply not true. The Defendant at all times disputed the 
amount of the debt and at all times relied upon the 
typewritten agreement as being an integrated contract which 
explicitly set forth the applicable, correct rate structure, 
CORRECTIONS IN APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts set out in the Statement of Facts in 
Appellant's brief from pages 9-14, are substantially 
correct. However, some of the facts set forth by Appellant 
in that section of the brief are contested, and it is 
believed essential for Respondent to at least point out the 
contested nature of those facts. 
Appellant states that Burningham and Dowdle initially 
agreed that Lloyd's would receive $1.00 for every pound of 
coffee extender product sold to Yurika. Dcwdle testified 
that such an agreement had been made, but Bufrningham 
testified to the opposite. (Tr. 481) Mr. Burningham 
testified that there was no meeting of the minds as to the 
commissions that would be paid to Lloyd's Unlimited until 
the handwritten agreement was executed. (Tr. 479-480) Such 
a conclusion is certainly consistent with both parties 
actions up to and including the signing of the written 
agreements. 
With respect to the rate structure in the handwritten 
agreement, Appellant states that Lloyd's claims that the 
rate on the handwritten agreement is 35C and not .35$ . 
This may by Lloyd's contention, but the court is referred to 
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the document itself, i.e., Exhibit 2. Surely this court 
will come to the same conclusion as the trial court. The 
rate (.35 *) for the 2 lb. bulk pack on the handwritten 
agreement is clear and unambiguous. 
Appellant claims in its brief, supposedly as a fact, 
that Dowdle had made a mistake in writing the rate structure 
in the handwritten agreement. However, Dowdle's actual 
testimony was contradictory. Dowdle testified that he drew 
up the handwritten agreement and that it was in his 
handwriting. (Tr. 424,636) Dowdle testified that the notes 
or additions were in his handwriting. (Tr. 630, 636) Dowdle 
testified that the addition of the commission rates schedule 
was made after presenting the handwritten agreement to 
Burningham and after a discussion was had between he and 
Burningham about the change. (Tr. 424,425) Dowdle testified 
that he had agreed to the addition of the commission rate 
schedule in the handwritten agreement and that both parties 
initialed the change or addition. (Tr. 426) 
Appellant states in its brief that the typewritten 
agreement was ambiguously or erroneously prepared with 
respect to the commission rate schedule. There is no 
support for such a statement. In fact, Dowdle testified 
that he had the typewritten agreement prepared, that the 
typewritten agreement was copied from the handwritten 
agreement and further that the commission rate schedule was 
taken directly from the handwritten original. (Tr. 634,637) 
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Dowdle testified that he read the typewritten agreement 
after it was typed and that the typewritten agreement 
contained the complete understanding of the terms of the 
agreement. (Tr. 637). 
The Statement of Facts from page 14 to page 19 of 
Appellant's brief becomes highly argumentative. Allegations 
set forth as facts are hotly contested at best and simply 
incorrect at worst. 
Appellant attempts to establish as fact that Nature's 
Way had admitted that the rate structure as advocated by 
Lloyd's applied to any commissions to which Plaintiff was 
entitled. This simply is not so. There is no basis for 
such a "fact". 
Appellant refers to the Answer and Counterclaim in 
which Defendant by affirmative defense alleged that the 
agreement was unenforceable because of failure of 
consideration. So what? Defendant also made a general 
denial of Plaintiff's complaint putting Plaintiff to its 
proof of all allegations in the complaint. 
Appellant refers to Defendant's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment wherein Defendant stated that it had no objection 
to what Plaintiff had set out as uncontested facts. 
Defendant at that time did not mention the controversy over 
the rate structure. Againf so what? Defendant successfully 
argued that there was ambiguity in the agreement and that 
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summary judgment was inappropriate. Defendant may have made 
a tactical miscalculation by placing all its eggs in one 
basket at that time, but there was never an intent to 
stipulate as to all other aspects of the case. 
Appellant states as a "fact" that defendant stipulated 
at the hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment that the rate 
schedule proposed by Defendant was true and correct and 
refers to Plaintiff's Statement of Proceedings of Unreported 
Hearing (Appendix C of Appellant's brief). However, there 
was no stipulation made by Defendant, and the court is 
referred to Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Statement 
of Proceedings of Unreported Hearing (Appendix A to this 
brief) and to the trial court's Findings on Statement of 
Proceedings of Unreported Hearing (Appendix B to this 
brief) . 
Appellant further states as "fact" that the trial court 
ordered at the hearing on January 22, 1985, "[t]he amounts 
prayed for in Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment shall be deemed accurate unless Defendant advises 
Plaintiff prior to trial hereof of any facts, documents or 
information upon which Defendant intends to rely with 
respect to any offsets or adjustments in said amount to 
which Defendant claims it is entitled." The trial court 
never signed the proposed order. (R 713, 174) It was only a 
proposed order. Evidently, the trial court did not agree 
with such an order. 
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Further, Appellant states as "fact" that Defendant 
failed to advise Plaintiff prior to the trial of any 
adjustments to which it claims it was entitled. Such a 
statement is simply not true. Even if the proposed order 
had been signed by the trial court, it would have called for 
Defendant to advise Plaintiff "prior to the trial hereof of 
any facts, documents or information upon which Defendant 
intends to rely with respect to any offsets or adjustments 
in said amount to which Defendant claims it is entitled." 
Defendant certainly did so advise Plaintiff. The general 
denial of Plaintiff's complaint put the amounts owed, if 
anyf as commissions in dispute. The agreement itself was 
used to establish the correct rate schedule, and the 
agreement was certainly brought to Plaintiff's attention 
prior to the trial. 
m 
Appellant states as "fact" that Defendant stipulated at 
trial that the amounts alleged by Plaintiff due as 
commissions were accurate. This again is simply not true. 
Defendant did not stipulate as to the monetary amounts which 
Plaintiff might recover if Plaintiff prevailed at trial. 
That was left for the Judge to determine from the evidence 
which was given, including Plaintiff's exhibit of the rate 
schedule and amounts determined thereunder by their 
accountant. Defendant did not object to the entry of 
Plaintiff's exhibits, but there was certainly no stipulation 
as to the amounts which were alleged to be due as damages. 
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Damages were to be determined by the trial court from all 
the evidence. Defendant did stipulate as to the quantities 
of product sold, but there was no stipulation as to amounts 
owing Plaintiff. (Appendix A and B) At trial, Defendant 
specifically stated that there was no objection "to what the 
exhibit shows unless for some reason we can show that 
[there] was a duplicate or for some other reason for saying 
that's not an accurate amount." (Tr. 430) The trial court 
saw the real issue. In talking about the accounting, Judge 
Conder stated, "The real issue here is what was the 
agreement." (Tr. 404) In other words, what did the 
agreement show as proper damages. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE: THE EVIDENCE FULLY SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS BY 
THE TRIAL COURT SUPPORTING THE CONCLUSION THAT THE AGREEMENT 
WAS AN INTEGRATED AGREEMENT WITH DEFENDANT BEING LIABLE FOR 
COMMISSIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXPLICIT TERMS OF THE 
TYPEWRITTEN AGREEMENT. 
POINT TWO: THERE IS NO BASIS FOR ESTOPPING DEFENDANT 
FROM ASSERTING THAT THE AGREEMENT IS GOVERNED BY THE ACTUAL 
RATE STRUCTURE WHICH WAS EXPLICITLY GIVEN IN THE INTEGRATED, 
TYPEWRITTEN AGREEMENT, AND THE TRIAL COURT WAS CLEARLY NOT 
IN ERROR IN CONSIDERING EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE EXPLICIT 
RATE STRUCTURE INCLUDED AS PART OF THE INTEGRATED, 
TYPEWRITTEN AGREEMENT. 
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POINT THREE: THERE IS NO BASIS FOR REFORMATION OF THE 
TYPEWRITTEN INTEGRATED AGREEMENT AND, THUS, THE TRIAL COURT 
DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING LLOYD'S LEAVE TO 
FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT AND TO ASSERT A CAUSE OF ACTION 
FOR REFORMATION OF THE TYPEWRITTEN AGREEMENT. 
POINT FOUR: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
FIND A MUTUAL MISTAKE BETWEEN THE PARTIES OR IN REFUSING TO 
REFORM THE TYPEWRITTEN, INTEGRATED AGREEMENT. 
POINT FIVE: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING 
THAT THE HANDWRITTEN AGREEMENT CONTAINED A COMMISSION RATE 
STRUCTURE AT THE RATE OR . 35C RATHER THAN THE RATE OF 35 <: 
POINT SIX: THERE WAS NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE 
TRIAL COURTS REFUSAL TO AWARD PLAINTIFF COSTS OF DEPOSITIONS 
AND OF A SUBPOENA ISSUED FOR TAKING THE DEPOSITION OF THE 
PRESIDENT OF DEFENDANT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE EVIDENCE FULLY SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS 
BY THE TRIAL COURT SUPPORTING THE 
CONCLUSION THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS AN 
INTEGRATED AGREEMENT WITH DEFENDANT BEING 
LIABLE FOR COMMISSIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 
EXPLICIT TERMS OF THE TYPEWRITTEN 
AGREEMENT. 
Mr. Justice Wolfe in Stanley *v Stanley 97 Utah 520, 
94 p.2d 465, 470, (1939), stated that the rule, with respect 
to the duty of the Supreme Court in view of an Equity case, 
was as follows: 
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"Our duty is to make an independent 
examination of the record. If after that 
we find 
(1) The preponderance of the evidence supports 
the trial court's findings of fact, or 
(2) If there is coubt in our minds as to 
where the preponderance liesf or 
(3) We think the evidence as revealed by the 
record may slightly preponderate against its 
conclusions but such preponderance may well 
be offset in favor of his conclusions by 
having seen the witnesses and been able to judge 
by their demeanor as to their credibility, 
then we will not reverse." 
See also Boccalero v Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126 
P.2d 1063, (1942). 
Respondent earnestly believes this Court will find the 
relevant evidence clearly preponderates in favor of the 
Respondent in this action. Even in the unlikely situation 
wherein this Court has a doubt or believes that the evidence 
may slightly preponderate against the findings of the trial 
court, the rule set out in the Stanely case still dictates 
that the decision by the trial court should not be reversed. 
This is because even if there is a question in this Court's 
minds as to where the preponderance lies or even if in this 
Court believes there may be a slight preponderance against 
the findings of the trial court, such questions should be 
offset in favor of the trial court due to the trial court 
having seen the witnesses and been able to judge by their 
demeanor as to their credibility. 
Appellant recognized that to mount a successful attack 
on the trial court's findings of fact that it must marshall 
all of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings 
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and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to 
support the findings even in the light most favorable to the 
court below. Appellant has failed to marshal all the 
relevant evidence and has not shown that that evidence is 
insufficient in a view most favorable to the court below to 
support the trial court's findings. 
Paragraphs 3 through 6 of the Findings of Fact are said 
by Appellant to be inaccurate, inconsistent and against the 
weight of evidence. This is clearly not so. 
As to finding number 3, the relevant evidence includes 
the testimony of Dowdle that he prepared the handwritten 
agreement, that there was a discussion wherein Burningham 
suggested changes to add the commission rate schedule, that 
Dowdle, incorporated in his own handwriting the rate 
schedule into the agreement and that both parties agreed to 
the handwritten rate schedule and initialed the added rate 
schedule. (Tr. 424-425, 630, 636). Burningham testimony was 
essentially the same. (Tr. 474-481, 490-492, 584-590) 
With respect to findings Nos. 4 and 5 concerning the 
rates in the rate schedules of the handwritten and 
typewritten agreements, the documents themselves show the 
rate schedules, and this court can readily determine that 
there was clear basis for the findings concerning the rate 
structures within the rate schedules. 
With respect to finding number 6 that the intent of the 
parties did not change between the execution of the 
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handwritten and typewritten agreements, the testimony by 
both parties as mentioned in the second paragraph above 
clearly establishes that the typewritten agreement was 
prepared from the handwritten agreement and that the intent 
of the parties did not change between the execution of the 
handwritten and typewritten agreements. 
Appellant attempts to cast a doubt on the findings, 
numbers 3-6, by way of irrelevant, unrelated material in the 
form of a red herring. Appellant states that Dowdle 
testified that the original oral agreement between the 
parties provided a commission rate of $1.00 per pound. Even 
if that were so, so what? The parties specifically set down 
and negotiated the written integrated agreements. The rate 
schedule of the written integrated agreements was negotiated 
and certainly took the place of any nebulous, oral 
commission rate that may have previously been discussed 
between the parties. It is here further pointed out that 
Burningham totally denied that he ever orally agreed to a 
commission of $1.00 per pound. (Tr. 480-481) Appellant 
makes a dubious claim that Burningham later admitted the 
existence of an earlier oral agreement providing a 
commission of $1.00. Appellant cites the Record or 
Transcript at page 593. It is interesting to quote from 
that page. The questions are by Appellant's trial counsel 
and the answers are by Burningham. 
Q. Do you recall any conversation where you 
asked him who was involved in this new 
multi-level, national food sales program? 
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A. Mr. Dowdle w o u l d n ' t t e l l me who was 
i n v o l v e d . 
Q. He w o u l d n ' t t e l l you, r i g h t — 
A. No. 
Q. — until he had a deal on a dollar a 
pound, isn't that true? 
A. That's correct, un huh. That's true, uh, 
huh. 
Respondent will leave it to this court as to whether 
such an exchange is an admission by Burningham as to a 
previous oral agreement involving a commission rate of $1.00 
a pound or an admission that Mr. Dowdle wouldn't tell 
Burningham who was involved in the food sales program. 
Appellant brings up the fact that a check for $500.00 
was paid to Lloyds. This is totally unrelated to the 
findings numbers 4-6. In addition, Appellant concedes that 
the $500.00 was paid without any formal accounting. 
Appellant says that the trial court erred in its 
findings as to the commission rate of the handwritten 
agreement. Appellant contends that no decimal point is 
included before 35 C . This court is referred to the 
document itself (Exhibit 2). It is completely evident and 
there is basis for the finding that there is a decimal point 
before the 35 C . What else is the marking which appears 
before the 35 £ ? Appellant's attorneys raised the 
possibility in an unreported hearing before the trial court 
that the mark before the 35* is a period. The trial judge 
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rejected that contention. The judge concluded that the 
mark was a decimal and that it was before the 35C . 
Appellant, at page 23 of its brief, alleges that 
Defendant admitted the parties intent was the rate structure 
set forth by Plaintiff. According to Appellant, such 
admissions are supposedly in Defendant's Answer, in its 
response to the motion for Suxiunary Judgment at hearings and 
on the first day of trial. Yet, interestingly Appellant 
does not include any references to the record herein to 
establish such admission. That is quite understandable, 
there is no such admission. 
Appellant contends that findings numbers 4-6 are 
inherently inconsistent. Appellant points out what is said 
to be a material difference in the rate structure of the 
handwritten and typewritten agreements. The typewritten 
agreement recites .50 £ whereas the handwritten agreement 
shows 50 £ . There is, however, no inconsistency in the 
trial courts findings. The typewritten agreement was an 
integration of an superceded the handwritten agreement, and 
the trial court probably concluded that the intent at the 
time the handwritten agreement was modified by Mr. Dowdle 
was to recite .50* instead of 50 * . Such a conclusion is 
certainly not unsupported. 
As pointed out above, the unambiguous testimony out of 
the mouth of Mr. Dowdle certainly stablishes that an arm's 
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length negotiation occurred relating to the commission rate 
structure of the handwritten agreement and that Mr. Dowdle 
prepared the typewritten agreement from the handwritten 
agreement. Plaintiff did not at any time until after trial, 
suggest that there was any material difference in the 
handwritten and typewrittne agreements. The preponderance 
of evidence clearly supports the findings of the trial 
court. 
POINT TWO 
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR ESTOPPING DEFENDANT FROM 
ASSERTING THAT THE AGREEMENT IS GOVERNED 
BY THE ACTUAL RATE STRUCTURE WHICH WAS 
EXPLICITLY GIVEN IN THE INTEGRATED, 
TYPEWRITTEN AGREEMENT, AND THE TRIAL COURT 
WAS CLEARLY NOT IN ERROR IN CONSIDERING 
EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE EXPLICIT RATE 
STRUCTURE INCLUDED AS PART OF THE INTEGRATED, 
TYPEWRITTEN AGREEMENT. 
Appellant did not raise the question of estoppel, prior 
to its past trial memorandums and this appeal, and there was 
no objection made by Plaintiff at trial when evidence was 
admitted concerning the commission rate structure to be 
applied under the agreement. By failing to raise the 
question of estoppel during trial, and by failing to object 
at trial, Appellant has waived any right to try such issues 
on appeal. Appellant would apparently like this Court to 
now act as a trial court and consider the issue of estoppel 
de novo. Further, inasmuch as Plaintiff made no objection 
to admitting evidence during trial, Plaintiff is itself 
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stopped from alleging now that the trial court erred in 
allowing such evidence. 
Applicant has used pretty good imagination in 
suggesting an issue relating to estoppel. But, even on the 
merits, there is no basis for estoppel. It is well 
established that to constitute an estoppel, there must be 
conduct amounting to a misrepresentation or concealment of 
material facts, and such facts must be known to the party 
sought to be estopped and unknown to the party who claims 
benefit of the estoppel. Cook v Cook, 174 P.2d 434, at 
436 (Utah 1946), Coombs v Ouzounian, 465 P.2d 356, at 358 
(Utah 1970). Contrary to the allegations made by Appellant, 
there was no new claim raised by Defendant on the second day 
of trial. The typewritten agreement contained a specific 
rate schedule for commissions. Evidence of the specific 
rates included in that schedule was introduced on the second 
day of trial, but that certainly did not encompass a new 
claim. The claim was based on the face of the agreement 
upon which Plaintiff had brought suit. 
There was no misrepresentation or concealment of 
material facts. The rate schedule included in the agreement 
was as well known to Plaintiff as it was by Defendant. 
Appellant argues that Defendant had admitted to the 
rate schedule which had been proposed by Plaintiff. This is 
simply not so. At no time did Defendant agree that 
commissions should be paid at the rate proposed in 
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Plaintiff's suggested rate schedule. Appellant does not 
cite any portion of the record other than a deposition of 
Burningham for support of its theory. In his deposition, 
Burningham responded to an ambiguous, theoretical question 
about what a payment may have been if he had made payment. 
Unfortunately, Burningham was led into an improvident answer 
by Plaintiff's counsel, and Burningham1s counsel must have 
been sleeping. However, the vague answer given by 
Burningham during the deposition in no way estops Defendant 
from litigating the integrated, written agreement to enforce 
the the actual commission rate as explicitly given in the 
integrated agreement. As stated in 8 Wright & Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure Section 2181 at 579, "A party 
may be embarrassed by his answer to a pretrail interrogatory 
in which he took a position different from one that he later 
asserts, and it is right that he should have to explain his 
change of position, but his answer to the interrogatory 
should not be a bar to taking a different position at the 
trial." 
POINT THREE 
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR REFORMATION OF THE 
TYPEWRITTEN, INTEGRATED AGREEMENT AND, 
THUS, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING LLOYD'S LEAVE TO FILE 
AN AMENDED COMPLAINT AND TO ASSERT A CAUSE 
OF ACTION FOR REFORMATION OF THE 
TYPEWRITTEN AGREEMENT. 
The trial court found that there was no basis for 
granting Plaintiff's attempt to reform the typewritten, 
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integrated agreement. The trial court clearly did not abuse 
its discretion in denying Plaintiff's leave to file an 
amended complaint for reformation of the typewritten 
agreement. There is no basis for reforming the contract, 
and in fact any such reformation would be in direct 
opposition to the universal law respecting integrated 
agreements. 
In Plaintiff's own memorandum in support of its Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment, it quite adequately set out 
the law. The following three paragraphs are taken directly 
from the Plaintiff's previous memorandum: 
The universal law with respect to the interpretation of 
contracts in this state is that the meaning of the contract 
is to be determined from the instrument itself and the court 
has the duty to first examine the language of the contract 
and accord to it the weight and effect which it demonstrates 
is intended. E.g.,Wingets, Inc. vs. Bitters, 28 Utah 2d 
231, 500 P.2d 1007, 1009 (1972); Big Butte Ranch, Inc. vs 
Holm, 570 P.2d 690, 691 (Utah 1977); Overson vs. United 
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 587 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 
1978) . 
A corollary to this fundamental maxim is that when the 
parties have reduced to writing what appears to be a 
complete and certain agreement, it will be conclusively 
presumed, in the absence of fraud, that the writing contains 
the whole of the agreement between the parties. In this 
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regard, the conclusive presumption also precludes the 
introduction of any parol evidence of prior or 
contemporaneous conversationsf representations, or 
statements for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms 
of the written agreement. State Bank of Lehi vs. Woolsey, 
565 P.2d 413, 418 (Utah 1977); Williams vs. Safeway Stores, 
Inc., 198 Kan. 331, 424 P.2d 541, 548 (1967). The rule has 
long been established that evidence of prior or concurrent 
negotiations are inadmissable to contradictive terms of what 
appears to be a final agreement. Lamb vs. Bangart, 525 
P.2d 602 (Utah 1974). 
The length to which Utah law will not alter a final 
contract is identified in Skousen vs. Smith, 27 Utah 2d 
169, 493 P.2d 1003 (1972). In that case, Plaintiff brought 
an action on a promissory note executed by the Defendant. 
The basis of the Defendant's defense in the action was the 
word "on" contained in the note was incorrect and should be 
substituted with the word "of" in its place. The Court 
refused to allow parol evidence on the matter, and refused 
to allow the Defendant to allege that the note did not mean 
what it clearly stated and held: 
"It is axiomatic that the language in a 
written instrument is interpreted more 
strongly against the scrivener who executed it. 
It is equally elementary that parties may be 
bound by the language they deliberately use 
in their contracts, irrespective of the 
fact that it appears to result in 
improvidence beyond and perhaps in excess 
of what the mythical, reasonable prudent 
man might feel constrained to venture." 
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493 P.2d at 1005. (R. 119-121) 
In the memorandum in support of its Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, Plaintiff specifically admitted "The 
Agreement is a fully integrated final document with clear, 
unambiguous terms (emphasis added) with respect to 
commissions to be paid by Defendant to Plaintiff." (R. 124) 
It is indeed clear that the terms with respect to 
commissions were unambiguous and contained no inadvertent 
error. As pointed out previously, the handwritten and 
typewritten agreements were both prepared by Mr. Dowdle. 
Mr. Dowdle was completely consistent each time in the exact 
figures used in the schedule of commissions contained in the 
agreements. The explicit terms were deliberately used at 
least two separate times. As was approximately stated by 
the Utah Supreme Court in the Skousen vs. Smith decision 
cited above, 
It is equally elementary that parties may be 
bound by the language they deliverately 
use in their contracts, irrespective of 
the fact that it appears to result in 
improvidence beyond and perhaps in excess 
of what the mythical, reasonable, prudent 
man might feel constrained to venture 
493 P.2d at 1005. 
Granting reformation in the present situation would be 
in direct contravention of the universal law relating to 
integrated documents. There is simply no basis upon which 
such a drastic action by this court can be supported. The 
trial court heard the evidence and by the demeanor of the 
witnesses judged the credibility of the witnesses. The 
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preponderance of evidence shows as pointed out previously 
that the addition of the explicit rate schedule was made 
after arm lengths negotiation. Such evidence certainly 
shows that the trial court exercised sound discretion, and 
certainly did not abuse its discretion, in denying 
Plaintiff's leave to file an amended complaint and to assert 
a cause of actioan for reformation of the typewritten, 
integrated agreement. 
POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING 
TO FIND A MUTUAL MISTAKE BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES OR IN REFUSING TO REFORM THE 
TYPEWRITTEN, INTEGRATED AGREEMENT 
There is no basis for reforming the integrated, 
typewritten agreement. Contrary to Appellant's contention 
there is no indication whatsoever that there was a mutual 
mistake or any mistake at all made at the time the 
typewritten agreement was finally executed. Dowdle 
testified specifically that he wrote the commission schedule 
into the agreement from figures which had been supplied by 
Burningham and which were agreeable to both the parties. 
(Tr. 425, 632, 633) The figures which Dowdle wrote into the 
handwritten agreement were exactly those which appear in the 
typewritten agreement. There was no error in the 
typewritten agreement. 
Further indication that there was no mistake of any 
kind including a scriveners error, is found in the 
handwritten and typewritten agreements themselves. Both the 
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handwritten and the type written agreements show a cent sign 
( £) used with the first three rates. A dollar sigh ($) was 
used with the fourth rate. (Exhibits 2 and 3) Dowdlef 
having been engaged in the selling profession for at least a 
substantial portion of his working life, certainly knows the 
difference between a cent sign and a dollar sign. So does 
Burningham. The explicit and consistent use of the cent 
sign and the dollar sign indicate that those signs were used 
with knowledge and intent to enumerate the specific rates 
given in the schedule of rates. 
There is no mistake in the present case. The equitable 
doctrine of reformation has no application in the present 
situation and certainly cannot overcome the legal principle 
that parol evidence cannot be used to vary or change the 
express written provisions in an integrated agreement. 
In Sine v Harper, 118 Utah 415, 222 P.2d 571 (1950) 
this court recognized that the right of reformation whenever 
allowed is necessarily an invasion or limitation of the 
parol evidence rule. Recognizing the drastic nature of 
reformation, this court set out criteria which must be met 
before reformation can be considered. Justice Latimer 
stated for the court: 
No such relief, however, can be granted, either 
when the contract is executory or 
executed, and no parol evidence can be 
used to modify the terms of a written 
instrument, and most emphatically when that 
instrument is required by the statute of 
frauds to be in writing, except upon the 
occasion of mistake, surprise or fraud; 
one or the other of these incidents must be 
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alleged and proved before a resort can be 
had to parol evidence in such cases. 
Id. 222 P. 2d at 579. 
In the present case, there is no mistake, surprise, or 
fraud. There is no miscopying of a description as in the 
Sine v Harper case. Dowdle, the chief officer of 
Plaintiff corporation, prepared the written agreements. Two 
handwritten forms were prepared and a £inal typewritten 
form. (Tr. 425, 4262, 427, 637) In the two handwritten 
forms, Dowdle wrote in his own handwriting, the exact 
schedule of commissions as appears in the final typewritten 
agreement. Dowdle testified that the rate schedule was 
negotiated between himself and Burningham and that both he 
and Burningham had approved and agreed to the rate schedule. 
There is no mistake. Dowdle deliberately wrote the specific 
commission schedule in exact terms three separate times. 
The second copy of the handwritten agreement, as 
included in the record at pages 227-229, was submitted after 
trial in an Affidavit of Burningham. The trial court 
improperly struck the Affidavit of Burningham, even though 
allowing an Affidavit of Dowdle. The Affidavit of 
Burningham was simply a rebuttal to the post trial arguments 
of Plaintiff. This court is referred, however, to the 
second copy of the handwritten agreement at pages 227-229 of 
the Record. As will be seen in the handwriting of Dowdle, 
the commission rate schedule is precisely and exactly the 
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same as the commission rate schedule in the typewritten 
agreement. 
As to the burden of establishing that an inadvertent 
mistake had been made, this courtf approving the general 
rule given in Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Section 
511, stated in the Sine v. Harper case: 
It is essential in order to obtain a decree 
rescinding or reforming a written conveyance, 
contract, assignment or discharge for 
mistake, that the fact necessasry for the 
allowance of the remedy shall be proved by 
clear and convincing evidence and not by 
a mere preponderance. (222 P.2d at 580) 
This court in the Sine v. Harper case cited with 
approval, the case of George v Fritsch Loan & Trust Co. 69 
Utah 460f 256 P. 400 (1927), wherein Mr. Justice Hansen 
stated the law in this jurisdiction to be as follows: 
The law is well settled in this and other 
jurisdictions that a written contract 
will be reformed to express the agreement 
of the parties where the proof of the 
mistake is clear, definite, and 
convincing, and where the party seeking the 
reformation is not guilty of negligence in 
the execution of the contract nor of laches 
in making timely application for its 
reformation. 256 P. at 403. 
In the present case, there is no showing of mistake, 
and certainly no showing by clear and convincing evidence as 
opposed to a mere preponderance. In fact, the preponderance 
of evidence is that no mistake occurred. Mr. Dowdle wrote 
the commission rate schedule three separate times, and he 
testified that the commission rate schedulehad been 
specifically approved and agreed upon by him and Burningham. 
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In the dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Pratt in 
Sine v, Harper, the Chief Justice points out that the 
mistake in the Sine v. Harper situation was created by the 
moving party. The Chief Justice would not have allowed the 
reformation under that situation. The Chief Justice stated: 
We have here a peculiar situation of an 
agent of the complaining party preparing 
the instruments in which the error could 
have been ascertained and corrected by a 
bit of careful examination of the papers 
involved. 222 P. 2d at 5881 
In the present case, Dowdle, the principal agent of the 
moving party, wrote the commission rate schedule by hand in 
the two handwritten agreements and had the typewritten 
agreement prepared. Dowdle testified that he read and 
studied the agreements prior to signing them. If there had 
been any error, he could have ascertained the error and 
corrected it. The inescapable conclusion is that no mistake 
was made nor included in the three separate written 
agreements. 
Further, even if there had been a mistake, Plaintiff is 
clearly guilty of laches in making timely application for 
its reformation. Mr. Justice Hansen in the George v. 
Fritsch Loan & Trust Co. case as cited in the Sine v. 
Harper case, clearly pointed out that the law is well 
settled that reformation will not be allowed where the party 
seeking the reformation is guilty of negligence in the 
execution of the contract or of laches in making timely 
application for its reformation. In the present case, the 
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agreements were made in August of 1982, and Plaintiff has 
delayed until after trial in January of 1985 to ask for 
reformation of the contract. A clearer instance of laches 
would be hard to find. 
The evidence clearly supports the trial court's 
decision to reject Plaintiff's attempt to reform the 
contract. There is no basis for this court to reverse the 
decision of the trial court. 
POINT FIVE 
THE TRIAL COURT DID LSIOT ERR IN FINDING 
THAT THE HANDWRITTEN AGREEMENT 
CONTAINED A COMMISSION RATE 
STRUCTURE AT THE RATE OF .35 CENTS 
RATHER THAN THE RATE OF 35 CENTS. 
Appellant argues that there is no decimal point before 
the 35 * in the handwritten agreement. (Exhibit 2). The 
trial court found in fact that the decimal point did exist. 
This court need only look at the handwritten agreement 
(Exhibit 2) to undoubtedly agree that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in making such a finding. 
POINT SIX 
THERE WAS NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO AWARD 
PLAINTIFF COSTS OF DEPOSITIONS AND 
OF A SUBPOENA ISSUED FOR TAKING THE 
DEPOSITION OF THE PRESIDENT OF DEFENDANT. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing 
to award Plaintiff costs of depositions and costs of service 
of a subpoena upon Burningham, the president of the 
Defendant corporation. 
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At the time of the deposition of Burningham, 
interrogatories had been answered and documents had been 
produced in response to a request for production. The 
material produced at trial came from the documents which 
were produced. Plaintiff also obtained documents directly 
from the Yurika Corporation concerning sales made by 
Defendant to Yurika. The deposition of Burningham was not 
necessary. The deposition was not published nor used at 
trial. 
With respect to the deposition of Webb, the deposition 
was long and costly. At trial, Plaintiff's counsel admitted 
that counsel did not propose to interrogate Webb on the 
stand with respect to "everything in the deposition by far." 
(Tr. 519) The trial court questioned the relevancy of most 
of the material of which Webb was to testify. The testimony 
of Webb was short, and his deposition was not published nor 
used at tiral. 
In First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Wright, 521 
P.2d 563 (Utah 1974) this court stated* 
The allowance of such costs is governed 
by these propositions: The burden is upon 
the claiming party to establish that they 
are necessary and reasonable; the determination 
of whether that burden is met is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court; and 
unless it is shown that the refusal to allow 
them is arbitrary, or a clear abuse of 
discretion, his ruling will not be disturbed. 
In the present case, the trial court undoubtedly found 
that the discovery could have been accomplished through less 
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expensive methods, such as interrogatories, requests for 
production of documents and requests for admissions. The 
trial court clearly did not abuse his discretion, and his 
ruling should not be disturbed on appeal. 
The trial court was eminently correct in his refusal to 
award the costs of the service of a subpoena on Burningham. 
Plaintiff failed to contact counsel for the Defendant 
corporation to see if the corporation would produce its 
president Burningham for a deposition. The costs of the 
service of subpoena could have been avoided by a simple 
telephone call. There certainly was no abuse of discretion 
in refusing to allow the costs of service of the subpoena. 
CONCLUSION 
The preponderance of the evidence clearly supports the 
trial court's findings and judgment. Therefore, Respondent 
respectfully requests this court to affirm the decision of 
the lower court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
TERRY $. CRELLIN 
Attorney for 
Defendant-Respondent 
J/^y 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This will certify that four (4) true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Respondent on Appeal from the 
Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, Honorable Dean E. Conder, were mailed, postage 
prepaid, to the following named individual at the address 
listed below this /tf day of May, 198$: 
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD 
Law Office of Ray G. Martineau 
1800 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South STate STreet 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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APPENDIX "A" 
TERRY M. CRELLIN (USB #0755) 
Thorpe, North & Western 
9662 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801) 5 6 6-6633 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LLOYD'S UNLIMITED, a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
NATURE'S WAY 
MARKETING, LTD., 
a corporation. 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF 
PROCEEDINGS OF UNREPORTED 
HEARING 
Civil No. C83-6058 
(Judge Dean E. Conder! 
Pursuant to Utah R. Ap. P. 11(g), Defendant objects to 
the proposed statement as to the proceedings of the hearing 
held before the above-entitled Court on January 22, 1985. 
Unfortunately, no transcript of the•proceedings was made by 
the Court Reporter, and the Statement of Proceedings, as 
proposed by Plaintiff, is seriously incorrect and 
unsubstantiated in many material aspects. 
Defendant agrees with the first paragraph of 
Plaintiff's proposed Statement of Proceedings. At the 
hearing on January 22, 1985, the Court considered two 
matters, plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
file herein dated January 4, 1985, and a Pre-trial 
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Settlement Conference, pursuant to Court Order dated 
November 26, 1984, on file herein. 
Defendant does not agree with the second paragraph of 
Plaintiff's proposed Statement of Proceedings, At the 
hearing, defendant, through its counsel, definitely did not 
stipulate that there was no issue with respect to the 
amounts, if any, due and owing by it to plaintiff as sought 
in Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on file 
herein dated January 4, 1985, pursuant to that certain 
Agreement between plaintiff and defendant dated August 16, 
1982. Defendant did agree that there was no dispute as to 
the number of items which were shipped by defendant. Those 
figures had been produced by defendant during discovery. At 
no time, however, did defendant stipulate that there was no 
issue with respect to the amounts, if any, due for such 
shipments. This point was again brought up at the very 
beginning of the trial, wherein defendant agreed to the 
schedule of items shipped but specifically stated that there 
was no agreement as to the monetary amounts due even if the 
contract were found to be valid. Defendant's principal 
opposition to plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment was that the Agreement was unenforceable because 
there was no indication in the Agreement that any actual 
consideration for the contract was given by olaintiff. The 
question of the monetary amounts prayed for by plaintiff, or 
as to the commissions to be paid by defendant for sales 
defendant made, were not materially addressed other than 
that defendant agreed that there was no dispute as to the 
number of items shipped by defendant. The major thrust of 
defendant's arguments was that there were questions of fact 
concerning the question of consideration and that because of 
those questions of fact, there could be no valid Partial 
Summary Judgment in favor of plaintiff. The court agreed, 
and the plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was 
denied. Plaintiff's counsel is clearly mistaken in. the 
alleged recollection that defendant, through its counsel, 
admitted that there was no dispute as to the amounts owing 
under the Agreement, if the Agreement was found to be 
enforceable. If anything, the exact opposite contention was 
maintained, and as pointed out above, the point that 
defendant did not stipulate to the monetary amounts due was 
stressed to the Court at the beginning of the trial. 
DATED this /9*k day of March, 1986. 
fi/h JC*A 
TERRY M. ORELLIN 
Attorney for Defendant 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This will certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Statement of 
Proceedings of Unreported Hearing was served upon the 
following, by mailing a copy thereof, postage prepaid, to 
the address listed below this // day of March, 1986: 
KEVIN J. 3UTTERFI2LD 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH 
Law Offices of Ray G. Martineau 
1800 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt LaKe City, Utah 84111 
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KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD (USB #3872) 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH (USB #3752) 
LAW OFFICES OF RAY G. MARTINEAU, P.C 
1800 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt. Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2400 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LLOYD'S UNLIMITED, a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NATURE'S WAY MARKETING, LTD., 
a corporation, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS ON STATEMENT OF 
PROCEEDINGS OF UNREPORTED 
HEARING 
Civil No. C83-6058 
(Judge Dean E. Conder) 
Plaintiff's Statement of Proceedings of Unreported 
Hearing and defendant's objection thereto came on regularly for 
hearing before the Honorable Dean E. Conder of the above-
entitled Court, on April 1, 1986, plaintiff appearing by and 
through its counsel, Kevin J. Sutterfield, and defendant 
appearing by and through its counsel, Terry M. Crellin, and 
the Court having heard argument of counsel, and having reviewed 
the file, now makes and enters the following: 
THE COURT HEREBY FINDS that defendant stipulated at 
the hearing held before this Court on January 22, 1985 to 
-1-
plaintiff's evidence of the quantities of product sold by 
defendant to the third party upon which the claim for com-
missions made by plaintiff was based. 
THE COURT MAKES NO FINDING as to whether defendant 
stipulated at the hearing to plaintiff's claim for the amounts 
owing plaintiff by defendant as set forth in Plaintiff's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment and memorandum and affidavit in 
support thereof because the Court does not remember whether 
such a stipulation took place. 
MADE AND ENTERED this day of April, 1986: 
BY THE COURT: 
Dean E. Conder 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This will certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings on Statement of Proceedings of Unreported 
Hearing was served upon the following, by mailing a copy 
thereof, postage prepaid, to the address listed below this 
day of April, 1986. 
Terry M. Crellin, Esq. 
M. Wayne Western 
THORPE, NORTH & WESTERN 
9662 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
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